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Single Resolution Board: another Meroni extension or another chapter to 
Europe’s Constitutional Transformation? 
 





The establishment of the Single Resolution Board (SRB) has pushed the constitutional 
boundaries of agencification further. After elaborating on the SRB’s powers and 
safeguards, one can argue that its governance structure combined with its policy-
making powers distinguish the SRB from all other agencies. While trying to assess its 
legality of establishment and empowerment, this paper seeks to identify the nature of 
the empowerment, whether Meroni is still fit for purpose, and whether the limits of 
institutional balance have been bent or indeed broken. After expressing concerns as to 
the SRB’s compliance with the current EU institutional framework, the paper offers 
an alternative for exiting this constitutional deadlock by applying Weiler’s theory of 
constitutional transformation. Such a solution would legitimize the SRB as well as 





Sixty years after the Meroni ruling1 and four years after the Short-selling case,2 the 
constitutional limits to agencies’ establishment and empowerment remain vague. In 
this context, the Single Resolution Board (SRB) – as a decision-making agency 
established under article 114 TFEU and as the competent EU resolution authority – 
‘departs from the model of all other agencies of the Union’3 and is called upon to 
perform complex assessments and decide directly upon national authorities and 
financial firms.  
 
From an institutional perspective, the SRB stands at the core of the Single Resolution 
Mechanism (SRM),4 which constitutes the second of the three pillars of Banking 
Union, the others being the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) with the European 
Central Bank (ECB) at its core,5 and a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS), 
which to this day remains a far-fetched goal.6 The underlying philosophy of this new 
                                                
* PhD Researcher and Teaching Assistant in EU Financial Law, University of Luxembourg. 
1 Case 9/56 Meroni v High Authority, ECLI:EU:C:1958:7. 
2 Case 270/12 United Kingdom v European Parliament and Council, ECLI:EU:C:2014:18. 
3 Rec 31, Reg 806/2014 (SRMR). 
4 Reg 806/2014/EU. 
5 For an extensive analysis, see C.V. Gortsos, The Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM): legal aspects 
of the first pillar of the European Banking Union (Nomiki Bibliothiki 2015). 
6 On the EDIS, see D. Howarth and L. Quaglia, 'The difficult construction of a European Deposit 
Insurance Scheme: a step too far in Banking Union?' (2017) Journal of Economic Policy Reform 1. For 
an overall analysis of Banking Union, see indicatively D. Howarth and L. Quaglia, The Political 
Economy of European Banking Union (OUP 2016); Niamh Moloney, 'European Banking Union: 
assessing its risks and resilience' (2014) 51 Common Market Law Review 1609; Dirk Schoenmaker, 
'The Banking Union: An Overview and Open Issues' (2016) ; Pedro Gustavo Teixeira, 'The Legal 
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architecture is that systemic credit institutions shall be supervised and – if need be – 
resolved at the EU level, ideally by using EU resolution funds.7 Compared to pre-
crisis supervision which was based on cross-border coordination, resolution was non-
existent; it was not until Lehman Brothers went bust that international, European and 
national regulators decided to enact resolution laws. At the EU level, Member States 
first enacted the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD)8 that established a 
minimum harmonisation resolution framework in the EU. The SRMR followed, 
essentially copy-pasting the BRRD and setting the procedural framework within 
which the SRB functions – only for Eurozone countries and countries opting in 
Banking Union. 
 
From a functional perspective, the SRB enjoys extensive powers. When a credit 
institution enters resolution, the SRB decides who will carry the losses and to what 
extent (bail-in), whether the institution will be broken down to a good and a bad bank, 
whether it will be sold to another institution, and whether EU resolution funds should 
be used.9 However, even before entering resolution, the SRB drafts resolution plans, 
and can take preventive measures that may affect an institution’s structure. To 
counterbalance these powers, the SRB operates within a multi-level system of actors, 
including the European Commission and Parliament, the ECB, the European Banking 
Authority (EBA) and the national resolution authorities (NRAs). The first (and only) 
crash-test for the SRB occurred in June 2017, when the SRB decided to resolve a 
Spanish bank, Banco Popular, by selling it to Santander for 1€ and imposing losses on 
shareholders and junior creditors.10  
 
Moving on to the legal assessment of the SRB’s establishment and empowerment, one 
should start the analysis by going back to the Meroni ruling and its latest 
transformation, the Short-selling ruling. Notwithstanding the usefulness of Short-
selling in paving the way for the SRB11, it is questionable whether Meroni has 
anything more to offer vis-à-vis the SRB. Meanwhile, it remains uncertain whether 
the SRB’s empowerment constitutes delegation or conferral. Apart from the obvious 
impact on the legal basis for its establishment, it is interesting to examine whether the 
two different forms of empowerment produce different legal outcomes. I argue that at 
the end of day it all comes down to respecting the principle of institutional balance. 
Be it delegation or conferral, whether the SRB disturbs the current institutional 
balance is an issue this paper touches upon. Moreover, I argue that one should review 
the SRB’s role within the broader legal-political environment that has been 
                                                                                                                                      
History of the Banking Union' (2017) 18 European Business Organization Law Review 535; Takis 
Tridimas, Banking Union: An Unfinished Story of Federalization (2016). 
7 Regarding the complexities of resolution financing, see Ioannis G. Asimakopoulos, 'International law 
as a negotiation tool in Banking Union; the case of the Single Resolution Fund' (2018) Journal of 
Economic Policy Reform 1; Christos Hadjiemmanuil, 'Bank resolution financing in the banking union' 
(2015) ; Willem Pieter De Groen and Daniel Gros, 'Estimating the Bridge Financing Needs of the 
Single Resolution Fund: How expensive is it to resolve a bank?' CEPS Special Report No. 122, 25 
November 2015.  
8 Directive 2014/59/EU. 
9 Art 18(6), SRMR. 
10 B Mesnard, A Margerit and M Magnus, European Parliament Briefing - The resolution of Banco 
Popular, 28 August 2017. 
11 Merijn Chamon, 'The empowerment of agencies under the Meroni Doctrine and Article 114 TFEU: 
comment on United Kingdom v. Parliament and Council (short-selling) and the proposed Single 
Resolution Mechanism' (2014) European Law Review 380.  
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established and sanctioned by the Court in the post-crisis era, namely in Pringle and 
Gauweiler.12  
 
That said, this paper aims to examine the SRB’s institutional and legal setup and its 
compliance with the EU legal order. Part 1 sketches the core powers of the SRB and 
its procedural safeguards. Part 2 examines the SRB through the lens of the Court’s 
jurisprudence on agencies, while part 3 focuses on the implications for the EU 
institutional balance. Part 4 suggests ways of exiting the current institutional 
deadlock, while trying to balance legal concerns and political economy 
considerations. I then conclude.   
 
 
Part 1: The SRB’s Procedural Labyrinth 
 
This part briefly examines the mechanics of the SRB’s decision-making powers and 
the procedural safeguards that are in place by breaking the analysis into two parts: the 
SRB’s preventive and resolution powers.13  
 
 
1.1. Preventive powers 
 
The core preventive competence of the SRB is resolution planning.14 The SRB drafts 
resolution plans in collaboration with the NRAs and in consultation with the ECB or 
the national competent authorities within a highly granular framework provided in the 
SRMR15 supplemented by EBA’s regulatory technical standards.16 Beyond its factual 
and technical nature, 17  there are three points that raise concerns as to their 
compatibility with the current constitutional framework; the resolvability assessment 
of an institution and the subsequent proposal of correcting measures,18 the definition 
                                                
12 Case 370/12 Pringle v Ireland and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2012:756; Case 62/14 Gauweiler v Deutscher 
Bundestag, ECLI:EU:C:2015:400. 
13 For an extended analysis of the SRB, see indicatively Christos Gortsos, 'The Single Resolution 
Mechanism (SRM) and the Single Resolution Fund (SRF): Legal Aspects of the Second Main Pillar of 
the European Banking Union (Fourth-Extended and Fully Updated-Edition)' (2018); Jens-Hinrich 
Binder and Dalvinder Singh, Bank Resolution: The European Regime (Oxford University Press 2016); 
Danny Busch, 'Governance of the single resolution mechanism' (2015) Busch, D; Ferrarini, G(ed), The 
European Banking Union 281; Marta Božina Beroš, 'Some Reflections on the Governance Framework 
of the Single Resolution Board' (2018) 56 JCMS 646; David Howarth and Lucia Quaglia, 'The steep 
road to European banking union: Constructing the single resolution mechanism' (2014) 52 JCMS 125; 
George S Zavvos and Stella Kaltsouni, 'The Single Resolution Mechanism in the European Banking 
Union: legal foundation, governance structure and financing' (2014) ; Council Legal Service (CLS), 
Opinion 14547/13, 7 October 2013. 
14 Art 8, SRMR. Other competences include the SRB’s discretion to exempt from or simplify the 
resolution planning rules for certain institutions (art 11, SRMR), and the SRB’s powers in the early 
intervention phase (rec 46 and art 13, SRMR). 
15 Art 8(9), SRMR. 
16 EBA, Final Draft Regulatory Technical Standards on the content of resolution plans and the 
assessment of resolvability 19 December 2014. 
17 CLS, n 13 supra, 8. 
18 Art 8(9)(e) and (f), and 10, SRMR. 
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of the minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL),19 and the 
definition of the key resolution policies. 
 
Starting from the resolvability assessment, the SRB needs to ensure that an institution 
is resolvable in real clock ticking terms. The on-the-ground assessment is conducted 
by the NRAs who then pass the information on to the SRB. The NRAs work on the 
definition of the preferred resolution strategy and tools, whilst the SRB works on the 
resolvability assessment and the MREL definition. On that basis, the SRB can order 
the NRA to suggest certain resolvability measures to the institution in question. 
However, the SRB cannot declare ‘material impediments (...) without a proper 
assessment of the implementation of the measures by the NRAs and the actions 
(required)’.20 Once the SRB has concluded on the identified material impediments to 
resolvability, it can instruct the NRA to take certain measures that can impact directly 
the legal, organizational and financial structure of the firm.21 On those issues, the 
EBA has issued relevant guidelines and technical standards.22 Notwithstanding the 
granularity of the rules, the SRB still enjoys ‘wide discretion’23 when it comes to 
resolvability. What is more, the SRB then instructs the NRAs to perform certain 
actions without them having any room for maneuvering.24  
 
Moving on to MREL, it ensures the loss-absorbing capacity of the firms, and thus, the 
effectiveness of the bail-in tool.25 The definition of the MREL is decided by the 
SRB,26 which arguably possesses wide discretion in this process – both technical and 
policy-related. Moreover, the SRB recently started setting binding targets for financial 
firms, including on the specific allocation of the MREL across the structure of a 
banking group (‘internal MREL’). When taking MREL-related decisions, the SRB 
again needs to respect a dense and granular framework, which consists of the 
Commission delegated regulations,27 following EBA’s work, and the SRB’s annual 
policy reports.28 In any event, the impact on the firms’ liabilities’ structure is evident. 
 
The elephant in the room, though, is the definition by the SRB of the policies to be 
followed in key-areas of resolution, such as the definition of the MREL policy. In this 
process, the NRAs that are interested in contributing to the policy discussion 
participate in working groups/committees, and express their views to the SRB. 
Nevertheless, the SRB decides at will without necessarily following the NRAs’ views, 
which cannot influence the voting procedure within the SRB’s executive session. 
These policies define the entire resolution planning process.  
 
                                                
19 MREL reflects the minimum amount of necessary eligible capital for bail-in. 
20 EBA, Decision on the settlement of a disagreement between the SRB and the National Bank of 
Romania, 27 April 2018, 8. 
21 Art 10(11), SRMR includes, inter alia, measures such as the requirement to divest specific assets or 
set up a parent financial holding company. 
22 EBA, n 16 supra; EBA, Gudelines on the specification of measures to reduce or remove impediments 
to resolvability and the circumstances in which each measure may be applied under Directive 
2014/59/EU, 19 December 2014. 
23 EBA, n 22 supra, 3. 
24 Article 10(11), SRMR. 
25 Rec 45, SRMR. 
26 Art 12(7), SRMR. 
27 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1450. 
28 For more information on the SRB’s MREL policy, see https://srb.europa.eu/en/content/mrel. 
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This leads us to the SRB’s governance structure. The SRB is governed by an 
executive session that includes the chair and four permanent members, and a plenary 
session that includes the NRAs as well. Almost all the important decisions are taken 
by the executive session.29 That is surprising when looking at the ECB’s structure, 
which comprises the Governing Council - similar to the SRB’s plenary session - and 
the Executive Board - similar to the SRB’s executive session. In the case of the ECB, 
the most important decisions are taken by the Governing Council and later on 
implemented by the Executive Council.30 Therefore, we face the paradox of having an 
EU agency taking core decisions with no national representation as opposed to an EU 
institution that allows its plenary formation to decide on all core issues. 
 
 
1.2. Resolution powers 
 
Given its sui-generis nature, resolution is triggered through a streamlined procedure.31 
The ECB initiates the procedure by declaring an institution as ‘failing or likely to fail’ 
(FOLTF). The SRB can do so itself, but only after notifying the ECB, and only if the 
latter does not do so itself. The SRB then examines whether any private sector 
alternative solutions to rescuing the firm exist. The ECB can perform this second step 
as well. Then, the SRB needs to conduct a public interest assessment on whether 
resolution is preferable to national liquidation. If the assessment is negative, then 
national liquidation applies; the Commission does not have a say therein since normal 
insolvency proceedings are considered the default scenario upon failure. If the 
assessment is positive, then the SRB determines the appropriate use of resolution 
tools as well as the necessity for the use of the Single Resolution Fund (SRF), which 
are included in the resolution scheme.32 The Commission has then 12 hours to 
challenge the SRB’s public interest assessment and 24 hours to challenge any other 
discretionary aspect of the scheme.33 If the Commission rejects the scheme, then the 
Council has a say as the final arbiter. If the use of resolution funds is decided, then the 
Commission needs to provide its clearance; this time, as the competent competition 
authority. Again, the SRB can circumvent the NRAs in case of non-compliance and 
address the resolution decisions directly to the credit institution under resolution.34 
Imposing fines upon firms falls also within the SRB’s toolbox. Needless to say that in 
this process investors’ rights can be significantly limited.  
 
The resolution scheme drafted by the SRB may include one or more of the following 
resolution tools: sale of business, establishment of a bridge institution where certain 
assets are being transferred, asset separation in a good and a bad bank, and bail-in.35 
Moreover, the SRB can violate the general pari passu treatment of creditors in 
resolution36 by excluding certain claims from bail-in.37 What is important to bear in 
                                                
29 Rec 32, 33 and art 43, 54, SRMR. 
30 Art 12.1, ESCB statute. 
31 Art 18(1), SRMR.  
32 Art 18(6), SRMR.  
33 Art 18(7), SRMR. 
34 Art 29(2), SRMR. 
35 Art 24-27, SRMR. 
36 Art 15(1)(b) and (f), SRMR. 
37 Art 27(5), SRMR supplemented by the Commission’s delegated regulation (EU) 2016/860. 
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mind is that all the SRB’s decisions are based on complex valuations.38 Moreover, 
given the strict time restraints when triggering resolution, valuations are likely to be 
provisional, as was the case in Banco Popular.39  
 
When conducting the public interest assessment, the SRB takes into account two key-
elements; the institution’s critical functions, and the impact on financial stability.40 To 
elaborate on the former, a function is considered critical when it is provided by an 
institution to third parties, and its sudden disruption would likely have a material 
negative effect on them.41 This definition suffices perhaps to understand the SRB’s 
discretion given the definitional overlap between the multiple objectives,42 which may 
lead to controversial public interest assessments. Comparing two recent cases 
illustrates the point – Banco Popular in Spain and Veneto Banks in Italy;43 in near 
identical notices, the SRB concluded that the former met the public interest 
requirement whilst the latter did not.44 On top of that, in the Italian case, following the 
SRB’s negative assessment the Commission approved state aid following the same 
reasoning, thus leading to a ‘tailor-made’ resolution with questionable legality.45  
 
Compared to preventive powers, the SRB when deciding upon resolution measures 
needs to operate within a dense network of actors. Beyond the ECB and the EBA, the 
Commission sits at the SRB’s executive session as a non-voting observer and needs to 
endorse the SRB’s resolution scheme in the end. Even though, in Banco Popular 77 
minutes were enough for the Commission to endorse the SRB’s resolution scheme,46 
it is reasonable to argue that as an observer, the Commission can effectively steer the 
SRB, by using as a negotiation tool its final say on the scheme; under that scenario, 
the Commission would only disagree with the SRB in case of a so-called 
‘bureaucratic drift’; that is that the Board decides to pursue its own policy agenda.47  
 
The last safeguard in resolution is the ‘no creditor worse-off’ principle (NCWO), 
which illustrates the fundamental principle that shareholders and creditors have to 
                                                
38 Art 20(10)-(12), SRMR. Willem Pieter de Groen, 'Valuation reports in the context of banking 
resolution: What are the challenges?' Banking Union Scrutiny. CEPS Special Report, July 2018 ; 
Martin F Hellwig, 'Valuation reports in the context of banking resolution: What are the challenges?' 
(2018) ; Rosa M Lastra and Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal, Valuation Reports in the Context of Banking 
Resolution: What are the Challenges?, 2018. 
39SRB, Valuation Report for the purpose of Article 20(5)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 806/2014, 5 June 
2017; Deloitte, Hippocrates Provisional Valuation Report, 2017. 
40 For the whole list of objectives, see art 14(2), SRMR. 
41 Art 2(1)(35), BRRD; see also SRB, Critical functions: the SRB approach, 2017; SRB, Guidance on 
the critical functions report, 2018. 
42 Willem Pieter de Groen, 'The provision of critical functions at global, national or regional level. Is 
there a need for further legal/regulatory clarification if liquidation is the default option for failing 
banks?' CEPS Special Report, 19 December 2017 ; Silvia Merler, 'Critical functions and public interest 
in banking services: Need for clarification?' Banking Union Scrutiny. Bruegel Report, November 2017. 
43 Regarding Banco Popular, see n.10 supra; regarding the Veneto banks, see B. Mesnard, A. Margerit 
and M.  Magnus, European Parliament Briefing - The orderly liquidation of Veneto Banca and Banca 
Popolare di Vicenza, 25 July 2017. 
44 Mara Monti, 'Italy versus Spain: two measures for solving the same banking problem' (2017) LSE 
European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog . 
45 Ioannis G Asimakopoulos, 'The Veneto Banks Resolution: It Shall Be Called ‘Liquidation’' (2018) 
15 European Company Law 156. 
46 Richard Crump, Banco Popular Investors say EU Officials doomed bank, Law360, 17 August 2017. 
47 Daniel R Keleman, 'The politics of 'eurocratic' structure and the new European agencies' (2002) 25 
West European Politics 93, 96. 
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receive better or equal treatment in resolution that they would have received under the 
default scenario of liquidation.48 Those who suffer greater losses are entitled to 
compensation.49 The Court is competent to assess whether this principle has been met. 
However, effective judicial review in this context will be indeed challenging; apart 
from organizational and economic challenges linked to the effort of assessing the 
uncertain counterfactual,50 there are significant legal barriers to an accurate valuation, 
and thus to the enforcement of the NCWO, such as the existence of as many different 
counterfactuals as the number of existing different national insolvency frameworks 
and the limited disclosure of information due to confidentiality.51  
 
 
1.3. What makes the SRB different? 
 
While the SRB operates within a very granular legal framework both in the preventive 
and resolution phase, the safeguards that are in place in the resolution phase do not 
exist in the preventive phase. In particular, whilst the Commission’s role in triggering 
resolution is legally convincing, neither the Commission nor any other EU body can 
interfere in resolution planning. What is critical is that the SRB is uncontrolled when 
deciding upon the policies to be followed in the entire resolution process.52 Moreover, 
the SRB’s governance structure stands out as one of its kind, with no national 
representation in the decision-making process on key issues such as the definition of 
the resolution policies. Therefore, the SRB’s governance structure combined with its 




Part 2: Placing the SRB within the Court’s jurisprudence 
 
Having elaborated on the SRB’s powers and its procedural safeguards, it is necessary 
to assess the constitutional legality of its establishment under article 114 TFEU and its 
empowerment. 
 
Trying to fit the SRB within the Court’s jurisprudence as regards the use of 114 
TFEU for its establishment, Short-selling is particularly insightful mostly due to the 
divergence between the Advocate General and the Court’s argumentation.53 The 
Advocate General concluded that the ESMA’s powers regarding its direct powers to 
ban certain financial products were beyond the scope of article 114 TFEU since the 
power to ‘make legally binding decisions directed at individual legal entities in 
substitution for either a decision, or the inaction, of a competent national authority 
                                                
48 Art 15(1)(g), SRMR. 
49 Article 76(1)(e), SRMR; On the NCWO, see indicatively Victor de Serière and Daphne van der 
Houwen, ''No Creditor Worse Off'in Case of Bank Resolution: Food for Litigation?' (2016) ; Hodge 
Malek QC and Sarah Bousfield, “Bad banks and the No Credit Worse Off Compensation Scheme, 
Butterworths Journal of International Banking and Financial Law, June 2016. 
50 De Groen, n 42 supra. 
51 Indeed, here one should appraise the role of the SRB Appeal Panel that decided to grant – even 
partial – access to the relevant documentation, see cases 38/17 - 43/17. 
52 Confirmed during informal interviews with resolution officers of two NRAs. 
53 Short-selling, n 2 supra; AG Opinion in Short-selling, ECLI:EU:C:2013:562. 
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which may well disagree with a decision taken by ESMA’ was not within the 
competence of the Commission before the enactment of the ESMA regulation, but 
rather within the national sphere.54 Compared to the ESMA, the SRB performs a 
much more systemically important function; it makes sure that financial firms are no 
longer ‘too-big-to-fail’, that financial stability is preserved, and that taxpayers will no 
longer be called up to bailout failed banks. It is perhaps a good idea to look back, 
when neither resolution rules nor the SRB existed. During that time, when banks went 
bust, national authorities would decide to cooperate with each other only if, by 
applying a game theory approach, they could see some individual benefit out of it; the 
collective good did not drive their decisions.55 In that regard, Ireland is the perfect 
example since during the crisis it chose to protect only its national banks, leaving 
foreign ones outside its bailout scope. Therefore, given the financial and economic 
interconnection that the Eurozone has generated such direct powers should meet, in 
my mind, the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity since harmonizing 
enforcement within Banking Union in times of crisis should be considered a measure 
of approximation within 114 TFEU. Nevertheless, I tend to agree with the view – also 
expressed by the Advocate General in Short-selling – arguing that article 352 TFEU 
would have been a more suitable option in the case of the SRB, if only was it not too 
much to ask from all 28 Member States to agree on a ‘measure’ affecting 19 of them.  
 
Moving on to the constitutional limits of empowerment through article 114 TFEU, 
one needs to define the particular form of empowerment that has occurred in this case. 
In this article, delegation refers to downward transfer of powers, from EU institutions 
to EU agencies, whilst conferral refers to the upward transfer from Member States to 
EU agencies, thus accepting distribution of powers as a vertical mechanism.56 Some 
argue in favour of an ‘upward’ delegation57 or ‘sideways’ delegation.58 However, I 
believe that over-broadening the definition of delegation can lead to a de facto 
circumvention of article 5 (1) TEU, which sets the limits of the principle of conferral. 
The Court, though, uses the notions of delegation and conferral in an interchangeable 
manner. 
 
As aforementioned, resolution rules did not exist before the crisis. Moreover, given 
their sui-generis legal nature we should view them as an equivalent of insolvency 
laws since, in essence, they were aimed at replacing insolvency laws as regards credit 
institutions. With that in mind, BRRD was first introduced to harmonize the bank 
resolution framework across the EU, and three months later the SRMR was enacted to 
put in place a stricter procedural framework for Banking Union countries. Both 
legislative frameworks were put fully into force on January 1, 2016. During the 
negotiation process, one of the key-challenges was the allocation of powers within the 
                                                
54 AdvG, n 53 supra, para 24, 37, 50-53. 
55 Dalvinder Singh, 'The Centralisation of European Financial Regulation and Supervision: Is There a 
Need for a Single Enforcement Handbook?' (2015) 16 European Business Organization Law Review 
439. 
56 Herwig CH Hofmann and Alessandro Morini, 'Constitutional Aspects of the Pluralisation of the EU 
Executive through ‘Agencification’' (2012) . 
57 Pieter Van Cleynenbreugel, 'Meroni circumvented? Article 114 TFEU and EU regulatory agencies' 
(2014) 21 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 64, 81; Pierre Schammo, 'EU Day-to-
Day Supervision or Intervention-based Supervision: Which Way Forward for the European System of 
Financial Supervision?' (2012) 32 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 771, 779. 
58 Martin Lodge, 'Regulation, the regulatory state and European politics' (2008) 31 West European 
Politics 280, 289. 
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SRM. Most Member States criticized the first SRMR proposal on grounds of 
allocating too much power to the Commission.59 Compared to the final version, the 
proposal provided that the SRB would recommend to the Commission the initiation of 
the resolution procedure, the Commission would decide and set the framework of the 
resolution actions to be taken, and then the SRB would go back to prepare the 
resolution scheme and address it to the NRAs.60 Urgency would suffice to allow the 
Commission to take over and trigger resolution and set the resolution framework 
itself.61 Even the scope of the direct resolution actions that the SRB can take is 
broader in the final version than in the Proposal since the final version added that the 
SRB can order the firm under resolution ‘to adopt any other necessary action to 
comply with the decision in question’.62 The alternative of putting the European 
Council in the forefront was suggested by Germany 63  but would have been 
problematic in times of crisis due to conflicting political interests and time pressure. 
Therefore, it is safe to argue that the empowerment of the SRB was a conferral of 
direct decision-making powers in a field of law that essentially replaces national 
insolvency laws (for credit institutions), and was considered as a preferable option 
compared to empowering the Commission or the Council. 
 
For the sake of the argument though, let us assume, that the powers were delegated to 
the SRB. This line of jurisprudence dates back to the Meroni ruling, when the Court 
ruled that delegation to a private law body should meet certain criteria, namely that (i) 
the delegator cannot delegate powers that it does not possess under the Treaties 
(conferral prohibition), (ii) the powers delegated need to be necessary for the 
performance of the tasks of the delegator, (iii) only clearly defined executive powers 
can be delegated – not powers that can be discretionary to the extent of enabling 
policy choices by the agency.64 Less known, and sometimes integrated into Meroni, is 
the Romano ruling, which ruled that the administrative authority could not adopt ‘acts 
having the force of law’ (binding acts) since that would impinge on the Commission 
and the Court’s powers.65 Those two cases had one common denominator; there was 
no possibility for judicial review at the time.66 
 
Since then, a lot has changed and the Lisbon Treaty now acknowledges the reality of 
agencies’ existence, yet it does not explicitly regulate their empowerment and its 
limits. Today, agencies’ decisions can be judicially reviewed just as any other 
decision by an EU body pursuant to Articles 263, 265(1), 267(1)(b), 277 TFEU. Even 
the gap regarding non-contractual liability of agencies, has been filled in by the 
Court.67  
 
                                                
59  European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation establishing uniform rules and a uniform 
procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a 
Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Bank Resolution Fund, 10 July. 
60 Art 16, Proposal. 
61 Art 16(6), Proposal. 
62 Art 29(2)(c), SRMR which does not exist in the respective article 26(2) of the Proposal. 
63 Howarth and Quaglia, n 6 supra. 
64 Meroni, n 1 supra, para 152. 
65  Case 98/80 Giuseppe Romano v Institut national d'assurance maladie-invalidité, 
ECLI:EU:C:1981:104, para 20. 
66 AdvG, n 53 supra, para 64. 
67 T-411/06 Sogelma v European Agency for Reconstruction, ECLI:EU:T:2008:419. 
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In this context, Short-selling, in all its controversy – given the fact that it did not 
touch upon the delegation/conferral issue and it refused to classify the establishment 
and empowerment of ESMA under either Article 290 or 291 TFEU, thus leaving the 
scope of the typology of acts open68 – did simplify Meroni. In essence, the Court 
narrowed down Meroni to the single requirement of prohibiting the delegation of 
discretionary powers unless they were adequately delineated and thus, amenable to 
judicial review.69 In its argumentation, the Court did not refer to the principle of 
institutional balance. However, I agree with the Advocate General’s opinion who read 
this sole Meroni requirement as a reflection of the institutional balance principle and 
the concerns for effective judicial review,70 which can be also subsumed under 
institutional balance.  
 
Shifting from delegation to conferral should not change the final outcome. The Court 
always assumed that empowerment was occurring by means of delegation instead of 
conferral, and thus never elaborated on the consequences of such distinction. One 
precedent exists, when in 1985 the Legal Service of the Council rejected the notion of 
delegation to describe the empowerment of the Office for the Harmonisation of the 
Internal Market, an agency, because “this specific case concerns the conferring of 
new powers, i.e. powers which have not at the moment been vested in any 
Community institution … the decisions of the Court in the Meroni Case do not seem 
to apply in this context”.71 Instead, the Legal Service applied constitutional principles 
that were included in the Meroni ruling as well.72 
 
That said, given the mellowed Meroni after Short-selling,73 the distinction between 
delegation and conferral should not produce different legal outcomes; their common 
denominator is institutional balance. 
 
 
Part 3: Institutional balance as the sole compass 
 
Institutional balance for the EU constitutes what separation of powers is for national 
Member States;74 it aims at ensuring the maintenance of the division of powers 
between the institutions, and ultimately to protect against abusive use of power.75 It 
reflects fundamental values, like democracy, legitimacy and accountability. Applying 
law and economics theory, institutional balance would be interpreted as a ‘multiple 
principals’ model, rather than a pure ‘agent-principal’ one. 76  In that regard, 
                                                
68 Short-selling, para 82-83. 
69 Ibid, para 53, 105. 
70 AdvG, n 53 supra, para 92. 
71 Legal Service of the Council, Opinion on the Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Community 
Trade Mark (5837/85) June 6, 1985, 6. 
72 Chamon, n 11 supra, 383. 
73 Jacques Pelkmans and Marta Simoncini, 'Mellowing Meroni: Hows ESMA can help build the single 
market. CEPS Commentaries, 18 February 2014. 
74 E Vos and Michelle Everson, 'European Agencies: What About the Institutional Balance?' (2014),13. 
75 Institutional balance used to contain also the purpose of individual protection, up until Case 282/90 
Industrie- en Handelsonderneming Vreugdenhil BV v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:1992:124, para 20-22; 
Jean-Paul Jacqué, 'Principle of Institutional Balance, The' (2004) 41 Common Market L Rev 383, 385-
386. 
76 Renaud Dehousse, 'Delegation of powers in the European Union: The need for a multi-principals 
model' (2008) 31 West European Politics 789. 
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institutional balance ensures the constitutionality of agencies as long as the different 
weights assigned to each institution are maintained and respected.  
 
Moreover, this allocation of weights is dynamic and transforms through time; as a 
general trend, the Commission has been steadily losing out, while the Parliament has 
been strengthened.77 Things become more complicated, though, when additional 
powers are conferred upon EU bodies, and that was evident during the SRM 
negotiations. Indeed, in the case of the SRM the stakes were perhaps higher that in 
any other case of empowerment. The resolution authority, irrespective of whether it 
would be an agency or an institution, would be equipped with direct resolution 
powers as well as the power to decide upon the use of European resolution funds. 
Looking into the future, the SRB is supposed to be also in control of the European 
fund aimed at protecting depositors (EDIS). That said, I believe it is reasonable to 
argue that no matter what body would end up taking on those powers – if done in a 
concentrated rather than dispersed manner – would lead to the disturbance of the 
existing institutional balance. 
 
In assessing the SRB’s compliance with the institutional balance as enshrined in the 
Treaties, we need to break down institutional balance to its constituent components. 
To begin with, agencies fall within the same framework as institutions as regards the 
principle of transparency,78 data protection rules,79 and the constitutional right of 
citizens to pose questions and receive answers in their own language.80 However, in 
the case of the SRB and given the sensitivity of the information that it possesses –
related to balance sheet information, resolution strategy, etc. – transparency is 
somehow compromised in the face of financial stability concerns. On that front, the 
decision of the SRB’s Appeal Panel needs to be acknowledged as pivotal in changing 
the SRB’s initial stance against the disclosure of any relevant documentation to its 
acceptance to disclose non-confidential versions of the resolution documents. 81 
Nevertheless, still limited information can be extracted from this documentation, but 
that is a restriction based, arguably, on legitimate concerns. 
 
That being said, one way of understanding institutional balance is that an agency 
cannot perform a role that other institutions would be able to perform under article 17 
TEU and other specific Treaty provisions. In the case of financial markets 
supervision, the ESMA has not replaced per se national capital markets authorities, 
but it has become the sole supervisor of Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) and has 
obtained certain direct intervention powers when it comes to placement of financial 
products. The fact that the Court upheld those powers is not surprising per se, be it not 
for the fact that it did not deal with institutional balance concerns at all 
notwithstanding the Advocate General’s strong views on that point. And if the 
supervision of CRAs is a niche area of supervision and the direct intervention powers 
are indeed limited, there is no doubt that the role of agencies has been upgraded via 
the SRB. The problem with the SRB, however, does not necessarily lie in the 
execution phase of a resolution scheme. At that point the ECB has had a say already 
by declaring a bank as FOLTF, the Commission has observed the workings of the 
                                                
77 Jacqué, n 75 supra, 390. 
78 Art 15(1) and (3), TFEU. 
79 Art 16(2), TFEU. 
80 Art 24, TFEU. 
81 Appeal Panel, cases 38/17-43/17. 
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SRB, the legal framework is rather granular, and the Commission has always a veto 
right; this setup is not perfect,82 but one cannot argue as a rule of thumb that the 
institutional balance has been breached. Instead, such a multi-principal dimension 
lacks in the preventive phase, especially when considering the SRB’s governance 
structure and the significance of its decisions therein. 
 
Another way of understanding institutional balance is through the typology of acts 
established under articles 290 and 291 TFEU.83 In this case, the lack of clarity is due 
mainly to the legislator, who did not include the agencies under their scope. In its 
current reading, article 291 TFEU can justify the empowerment of agencies but only 
by means of delegation, not conferral. In that regard, the Court’s approach in Short-
selling added to the uncertainty by ruling that the typology list included in articles 290 
and 291 TFEU is not exhaustive, and thus other forms of empowerment of agencies 
can transpire. Following this article’s argumentation, conferral of powers to agencies 
could well occur. 
 
That takes me to the role of the Court. The role of the Court is fundamental to the 
EU’s institutional balance and articles 19 TEU and 47 of the Charter aim to ensure 
that the Court provides effective judicial protection. The main challenge in that regard 
is that an agency like the SRB is equipped with wide discretion when deciding. The 
exercise of this discretion is inherent in the complex technical assessments it conducts 
under which lie – implicitly or explicitly – policy related choices.84 The SRB takes all 
its decisions based on complex valuations which contain quantifications of the 
effectiveness of the different national insolvency frameworks compared to EU 
resolution, specifications of what constitutes critical functions in each case, etc. What 
is more, looking at the two examples above, that of the Spanish Banco Popular and 
the Italian Veneto banks, even the final wording of the decisions does not help 
understand how discretion was exercised in each case. 
 
Digging deeper into discretion, some scholars apply the distinction between 
‘administrative’ and ‘technical’ discretion, with the idea being that administrative 
discretion exists when there is still discretion left after all the technical aspects of a 
given case have been sorted out. In the Court’s jurisprudence we could argue that this 
distinction applied in the recent Gauweiler case, where the court assessed the ECB’s 
monetary powers related to the OMT program.85 In that case, the Court seems to have 
trusted the ECB in its assessment of what constitutes financial stability and what does 
not by broadening the scope of what can fall under the ‘facts’ category. However, I do 
not think that one should over-rely on Gauweiler when it comes to judicial review 
since the ECB’s decision was not implemented at the time, but it was rather based on 
a press release following a decision of the ECB Governing Council plus it was 
                                                
82 Moloney, n 6 supra; Damien Geradin and Nicolas Petit, 'The development of agencies at EU and 
national levels: Conceptual analysis and proposals for reform' (2004) , where they see the Meroni-
related constitutional restraints as an impediment to the necessary development of EU agencies. 
83 Herwig Hofmann, 'Legislation, delegation and implementation under the Treaty of Lisbon: typology 
meets reality' (2009) 15 European Law Journal 482. 
84 For a holistic analysis of discretion and judicial review, see Joana Mendes, 'Discretion, care and 
public interests in the EU administration: Probing the limits of law' (2016) 53 Common Market Law 
Review 419; Joana Mendes, 'Bounded Discretion in EU Law: A Limited Judicial Paradigm in a 
Changing EU' (2017) 80 The Modern Law Review 443. 
85 Case 62/14 Peter Gauweiler and Others v Deutscher Bundestag, ECLI:EU:C:2015:400. 
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dealing with issues of monetary policy, which are not specified anywhere else apart 
from the broad wording of the Treaties.86 
 
Instead, I would rather argue that one looks at the latest decisions of the General 
Court regarding the definition of leverage ratios by the ECB.87 There, the dispute 
between the French Banque Postale and the ECB related to the calculation of the 
former’s leverage ratios according to the capital requirements regulation (CRR).88 
Under article 429(14) CRR, the law allowed for certain low-risk financial products to 
be exempted from calculation. The ECB, which had discretion to decide (the Court 
confirmed ECB’s discretion), rejected the bank’s request to proceed with the 
exemption, even though the requirements under article 429(14) CRR were fulfilled. 
The Court dag into the details of how the ECB exercised its discretion and concluded 
that the ECB conducted a manifest error by basing its rejection on liquidity risk 
concerns, even though controlling for liquidity risk was beyond the scope of the said 
provision.89 As a result, it argued that upholding the ECB’s decision would turn 
article 429(14) CRR practically inapplicable (effet utile argument). This latest 
judgment by the Court proves that it can indeed provide effective judicial protection 
against discretion that is exercised on the basis of complex financial technical 
assessments, by digging even into the overall objective of the provision in question. 
Two additional points. On the one hand, this case proves that when a rule is 
sufficiently granular, as is the case with prudential as well as resolution rules, the 
Court can indeed conduct a full review without risking of going beyond its mandate 
and replacing the administrative body, which would breach institutional balance. In 
that regard, whether the Court applies a stringent standard of review, as in 
competition law cases following Tetra Laval,90 or a more lenient judicial review 
based on the principle of the duty of care91 should lead to similar outcomes when the 
law is that granular and specific. On the other hand, though, in all its complexity, the 
ECB’s error was indeed manifest, and the political significance of the case rather low. 
 
Overall, no judicial approach to discretion is perfect, and that has been historically 
observed also in the most stringent standard of review that applies in competition 
law.92 Besides, the Court’s role is also restrained by institutional balance; as the Court 
puts it ‘the Court must limit its review of such an appraisal to verifying whether the 
relevant procedural rules have been complied with, whether the statement of the 
reasons for the decision is adequate, whether the facts have been accurately stated and 
whether there has been any manifest error of appraisal or a misuse of powers’.93 In 
other words, the Court cannot heal the questionable institutional legality of an agency; 
in our case of the SRB. Going back to the ‘multi-principals’ model of institutional 
balance, increasing the weight on an agency does not seem to be counterbalanced by 
                                                
86 Mendes, n 84 supra, 421. 
87 T-733/16 La Banque postale v ECB, ECLI:EU:T:2018:477. 
88 Regulation 575/2013/EU. 
89 Banque postale, n 87 supra, para 75-78. 
90 Case 12/03 Commission of the European Communities v Tetra Laval BV, ECLI:EU:C:2005:87, para 
39, 43, where the Court interpreted the information that was considered of an economic nature in order 
to identify whether the Commission in that case decided based on facts that adequate, accurate, 
reliable, consistent, and capable of substantiating the conclusions drawn from it. 
91 Herwig CH Hofmann, 'Delegation, Discretion and the Duty of Care in the Case Law of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union' (2018) . 
92 Pablo Ibanez Colomo, The shaping of EU competition law (CUP 2018). 
93 C-42/84 Remia BV and others v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:1985:327, para 34. 
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any other institution. This, of course, does not mean that the SRB is an agency beyond 
any control. My argument is that these restraints, be it endogenous – i.e. the 
Commission’s veto power and the Court’s judicial review – or exogenous – i.e. 
economic reality94 – do restrain the SRB, but at the same time do position the SRB in 
a hierarchical superior position than all other agencies in the past, especially when 
considering its governance structure and policy-making powers in resolution 
planning; and that, in my mind, is a breach of the principle of institutional balance.  
 
 
Part 4: Beyond institutional balance, to constitutional transformation 
 
Throughout the lifetime of the EU it is not the first time that such legal deadlocks 
have been reached; and it is not the Court’s fault either. It is rather a structural flaw of 
the EU as a sui-generis polity. Given the dynamic nature of institutional balance and 
given the inherent difficulty to amend the treaties in a timely manner, it is only logical 
that, sometimes, political reality will not be reflected into the legal one. Such was the 
Chernobyl case that led to the strengthening of the rights of the European Parliament, 
even though this mutation was pushed towards (intuitively) the right direction; that of 
promoting democracy within the EU.95  
 
This paper argues that a change in the notion of institutional balance has occurred 
post-crisis. The fact that the SRB was empowered with technical competences with 
clear policy-related implications, and the clear preference of the Member States to 
empower the SRB instead of the Commission, reflects a deeper transformation, a 
metamorphosis of the evolving relationship between the Union and its Member 
States. Weiler’s theme of ‘constitutional transformation’ is rather useful in this case.96 
At the core of this theory stands the need to understand constitutional change beyond 
formal amendment, which goes beyond a broad constitutional interpretation.97 Such a 
tool would allow us to avoid a final conclusion on the SRB’s compliance with the 
existing institutional balance as legal or illegal, but provide as an alternative instead. 
 
Constitutional transformation requires three constituent components. First, all critical 
interpretative communities, and most importantly the Member States, need to accept 
the new meaning that the transformation has infused into the legal rule; in our case the 
principle of institutional balance. On top of that, the European constitutional 
adjudicator, the Court, needs to sanction the new meaning, setting forth its 
                                                
94 Also identified in Pablo Ibanez Colomo’s work, see n 92 supra, 330. 
95 Case 70/88 European Parliament v Council, ECLI:EU:C:1990:217. 
96 Joseph HH Weiler, 'The transformation of Europe' (1991) Yale Law Journal 2403. Ioannidis used it 
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constitution changed during the Eurozone crisis' (2016) 53 Common Market Law Review 1237. One of 
the most recent publications dealing with the post-crisis allocation of powers, see Joana Mendes and 
Ingo Venzke, Allocating Authority: Who Should Do what in European and International Law? 
(Bloomsbury Publishing 2018); other related publications, Federico Fabbrini, Economic governance in 
Europe: comparative paradoxes and constitutional challenges (OUP 2016) ; Mark Dawson and Floris 
De Witte, 'Constitutional Balance in the EU after the E uro‐Crisis' (2013) 76 The Modern Law 
Review 817; Bruno De Witte, 'Euro crisis responses and the EU legal order: increased institutional 
variation or constitutional mutation?' (2015) 11 European Constitutional Law Review 434.  
97 Weiler, n 96 supra, 2438; De Witte, 'Euro crisis responses and the EU legal order: increased 
institutional variation or constitutional mutation?', 436. 
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understanding for subsequent cases.98 Second, constitutional transformation requires a 
narrative. Whilst Weiler used the economic concept of exit and voice,99 I apply 
Ioannidis’ modified version that is based on the concept of moral hazard.100 In 
particular, Ioannidis used moral hazard since his aim was to create a narrative that 
would justify the shift from market financing to public financing, and from market 
discipline101 to bureaucratic discipline. Moral hazard in the case of the SRM relates to 
risk-sharing as provided through the use of European resolution funds (SRF) with the 
(theoretical) backstop of the ESM.102 Moreover, given the political reluctance to move 
towards a fiscal union, a fully operational Banking Union with centralised governance 
is necessary to provide for a common level playing field, which goes beyond 
harmonized rules to harmonized enforcement, in order to promote cross-border 
banking and thus, risk-sharing at an individual level instead of at a state level. In other 
words, an additional factor to this narrative is the need to create a banking union that 
will function as a credible shock absorber within Eurozone.103 The third component is 
the explanation of the Member States’ stance towards these transformations. In both 
Weiler and Ioannidis, Member States supported these transformations under the 
consideration that they would retain or even augment their power.104 In the case of the 
SRB, the acceptance of the transformation by the Member States was a necessity 
rather than a choice; the least negative scenario for governments to save their banks 
and themselves.  
 
Applying the theory of constitutional transformation in the case of the SRB would 
allow as to recognise that within Eurozone the governance of banking and financial 
markets industry needs to be elevated at the EU level due to financial stability risks 
that one Member State’s malpractice might generate for the entire Eurozone, but also 
due to the need to have harmonized rules and enforcement in order to allow for the 
much needed cross-border consolidation within the banking and financial markets 
sector. Endorsing this transformation would allow for a fully functional Banking 
Union and Capital Markets Union to arise without the political impediments that the 
current constitutional framework imposes. The Veneto banks case illustrates the 
controversy to which the current framework can lead to. 
 
To add to that, a fully independent, institution-like SRB, would allow the 
incorporation within the SRMR of the much needed flexibility that the SRM requires. 
Each resolution case is different and a ‘one size fits all’ approach cannot apply in all 
cases. Indeed, sometimes, limited bail-in together with limited bailout might be 
economically preferable to a full bail-in. At the moment, by trying to limit the 
discretion of the resolution authority, we effectively push Member States to find 
alternative ways of bypassing the European framework in order to avoid a strict bail-
in. Upgrading the SRB would open the way for some sort of flexible solution as the 
                                                
98 Weiler, n 96 supra, 2437; De Witte, n 97 supra, 448. 
99 Weiler, n 96 supra, 2410-2412. 
100 Ioannidis, n 96 supra, 1245-1247. 
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IMF has suggested; that of incorporating a ‘financial stability’ clause in the SRM that 
would allow for full bail-in to be circumvented if justified on financial stability 
grounds.105 
 
Moreover, I believe that the theory of constitutional transformation allows us to better 
understand Short-selling. The fact that the Court’s Grand Chamber did not justify why 
it did not take into consideration the Advocate General’s legitimate concerns is, in my 
mind, the first signal of acceptance by the Court of the ongoing constitutional 
transformation that relates to the role that EU agencies have within the EU 
institutional setup.  
 
Building upon Short-selling, the Court has the opportunity to explicitly acknowledge 
the economic reality that generates the need for politically neutral entities to 
participate in the economic governance of the EU. Under this post-transformation 
institutional balance, agencies should be entrusted in taking up discretionary powers 
that would go beyond complex technical assessments and would recognise the need 
for some sort of policy-related decision-making. This would contribute to the 
strengthening of the current institutional balance ‘multi-principal’ model by adding 
agencies as another intermediate pillar of governance between Member States and the 
EU. At a later stage, Member States should step up and integrate these changes into 
the post-Lisbon treaties. 
 
One would, of course, wonder why the EU has yet to officially accept this 
transformation, if all parties are better off in the end. Once again, it all comes down to 
the people.106 To this day, even post-crisis, the strong belief of attaching legitimacy to 
the nationals prevails, and is particularly, evident in the banking sector.107 The EU 
currently struggles to find an alternative model. Even the outcome-based legitimacy 
that the EU enjoyed since its early years no longer sounds appealing given the distrust 
that followed the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis.108 The only certain thing is that until 
some sort of political union occurs, and some sort of European ‘demos’ evolves to the 
point of impacting European politics, what European and national constituencies will 
expect from the SRB, and agencies alike, will be to square the circle by balancing 





At the end of this analysis, it is useful to pause and consider how EU agencies were 
envisaged to be ten years ago and how the SRB is actually structured and empowered 
today. The differences are evident. In essence, this was the first goal of this paper – to 
invite the reader to understand how the SRB’s powers are structured and what sort of 
safeguards are put in place. 
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The second goal of this paper was to point out to the fact that the SRB’s 
empowerment has been a conferral rather than a delegation of powers, and that the 
only yardstick for an agency’s legality is its compliance with the principle of 
institutional balance. Comparing the constitutional limits that are put into 
empowerment through delegation – that is today, the mellowed Meroni ruling – and 
the ones that are put through conferral, it makes no more sense, in my mind, to stick 
to the Meroni judgment since it all comes down to whether an agency is aligned or 
not with the principle of institutional balance. The Short-selling ruling in this context 
and in all its controversy has been decisive in opening up the way to allowing the 
conferral of powers to agencies. 
 
The third goal was to understand whether the SRB actually complies with the current 
EU institutional balance. While acknowledging the strict environment that the SRB is 
called upon to operate, namely the granular legal framework and the Commission’s 
veto power, one cannot but acknowledge the policy-related dimensions in the SRB’s 
decision-making. This is particularly true in the resolution planning phase, when the 
SRB’s executive session takes binding policy decisions that affect the entire 
resolution process. This elevation of the SRB’s empowerment that goes beyond 
technical assessment and extends to policy-making considerations combined with its 
unique (apolitical) governance structure is what leads me to conclude that the SRB’s 
establishment disturbs the current institutional setup. 
 
That takes me to the fourth goal of this paper, which was to suggest a way out of this 
constitutional deadlock. In this vein, the analysis was based on Weiler’s theme of 
constitutional transformation. Applying this theme is particularly useful not only for 
interpreting the Short-selling case, and legitimizing the SRB beyond doubt, but also 
sets the foundations for a fully-fledged banking union and capital markets union to 
occur.  
 
 
 
